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Why do low-income individuals often oppose redistribution? We hypothesize that an aversion to being
in "last place" undercuts support for redistribution, with low-income individuals punishing those slightly
below themselves to keep someone "beneath" them. In laboratory experiments, we find support for
"last-place aversion" in the contexts of risk aversion and redistributive preferences. Participants choose
gambles with the potential to move them out of last place that they reject when randomly placed in
other parts of the distribution. Similarly, in money- transfer games, those randomly placed in second-to-last
place are the least likely to costlessly give money to the player one rank below. Last-place aversion
predicts that those earning just above the minimum wage will be most likely to oppose minimum-wage






















Individuals in low-income groups often seem to vote against their economic interests, even as their
shared circumstances would suggest that they would unite to demand greater redistribution. Ameri-
cans have expressed widespread support for repealing the estate tax and for tax reforms that largely
benet those in the highest brackets (Bartels, 2008). Whereas the median-voter theorem (Meltzer
and Richard, 1981) predicts that the demand for redistribution grows with income inequality, the
large increases in inequality over the past thirty years have not led to greater support for redistri-
bution in the US (Kelly and Enns, 2010), the UK (Georgiadis and Manning, 2011), or other OECD
countries that have experienced rising inequality (Kenworthy and McCall, 2008).1
Scholars have oered many explanations for the seeming inability of lower-income groups to
unite in support of redistributive policies.2 The Marxist notion of \false consciousness" holds that
the capitalist class promotes ideological concepts that blind the proletariat to their common inter-
ests (Engels, 1893). Similarly, Therston Veblen argued that members of the working class tend to
admire the \leisure class" and even mimic its habits|such as conspicuous consumption|instead
of identifying with members of their own class (Veblen, 1899). Especially in the American con-
text, scholars often argue that racial, ethnic or cultural divisions (Woodward 1955; Alesina et al.
2001; Frank 2004) as well as a belief in income mobility (B enabou and Ok, 2001) limit support for
redistribution.
This paper oers another explanation, which to our knowledge has not been formally explored
in past research. We hypothesize that there is a basic aversion to feeling that one is in \last place,"
which increases competition and inhibits political unity among members of lower-income groups.
Instead of uniting in pursuit of general redistribution, working-class groups may wish to punish
those who are slightly below or above themselves, with the hope of having at least one group to
\look down on." As the probability of falling to the bottom of the income distribution decreases
with income, anxiety about relative position would be less of a concern for middle- and upper-class
individuals.
Our work relates to the large literature, pioneered by Duesenberry (1949), suggesting that utility
1See Picketty and Saez (2003) on the increase in income inequality in the US over the past several decades.
2When we refer to \redistributive policies" we mean policies explicitly designed to address economic inequality.
Of course, many policies redistribute resources from one group to another, and the recipients are often not the least
well o.
1is related not only to absolute consumption or wealth but also to an individual's relative position
in a given set of peers. Last-place aversion predicts that concerns about rank are most acute
at the bottom of the distribution, and thus that utility may be convex with respect to relative
position.3 While we focus on the implications of last-place aversion and not its potential origins, it
is consistent with the large social psychology literature on the power of shame and embarrassment
as social emotions: there is likely little shame in nishing near the middle, so the eect of rank on
shame should quickly diminish once someone moves from the bottom of the distribution.4
We explore whether an aversion to being in last place can help predict economic phenomena
such as individuals' preferences over risky versus risk-free payos and their preferences regarding
tax and transfer policies. We begin by dening a simple utility function that incorporates last-
place aversion (LPA) and then develop laboratory experiments to test its predictions for both
risk aversion and redistributive preferences. In the rst experiment, subjects are randomly given
distinct dollar amounts and then shown the resulting \income" distribution. Each player is then
given the choice between receiving a payment with probability one and playing a two-outcome
lottery of equivalent expected value, where the \winning" outcome of the lottery will typically oer
the player the possibility of moving up in rank. We nd that the probability of choosing the lottery
is uniform across the distribution except for the two lowest-placed players, who choose the lottery
more often. These results match the Nash equilbrium of the game when players are last-place averse:
the last-place player is willing to bear the risk of the lottery for the possibility of moving up in
rank, and the second-to-last-player is willing to do the same in order to defend his position.
In the second set of experiments, players play two money-transfer games. In both games, in-
dividuals are randomly assigned a unique dollar amount, with each player separated by a single
dollar, and then shown the resulting distribution. The rst game mimics a typical redistributive
3To the extent non-linearities in the eect of relative position on utility have been explored in existing research,
they have generally been modeled as allowing the eect of the absolute index to vary with relative position, as in
(Clark and Oswald, 1998). For example, Card et al. (2010) nd that the dierence between own pay and median pay
in a sample of University of California employees has a larger eect for those below the median than those above.
In contrast, Luttmer (2005) nds that the eect of neighbors' income is the same for individuals who are above and
below the median income in their MSA. Our model of utility in Section 2 focuses directly on rank and not deviations
in the absolute index from a given reference point. Zhou and Soman (2003) oer evidence consistent with concave
eects of relative position in a setting where rank is salient, demonstrating the the probability of an individual leaving
a queue depends more on the number of people behind than the number of people ahead of him, potentially suggesting
that individuals are more sensitive to being close to last place than close to rst, though other interpretations are
possible.
4See Goman (1967) for an early treatment on the function of shame, who writes that \the emotion of embarrass-
ment or anticipation of embarrassment plays a prominent role in every social encounter."
2scheme where individuals are asked to contribute income to those at the bottom of the distribu-
tion. Specically, we give players the choice between receiving an additional dollar themselves, or
having an additional two dollars added to the last-place player's balance. As LPA predicts, the
second-to-last place person is the least likely to forgo the dollar.
Players in the second game are again randomly assigned a place in an income distribution
where ranks are separated by a dollar. They are then given an additional $2, which they must
give to either the person directly above or below them. Giving to the person below means that the
individual herself will fall in rank. We nd that the second-to-last-place person is the most likely
to give the extra two dollars to the person above her instead of the person below her, consistent
with LPA's prediction that concern about relative status will be greatest for individuals who are
at risk of falling into last place. In both games, we can show that merely being in the bottom half
of the distribution does not explain the results|players must actually be close to last place|and
can generally reject inequality aversion as an alternative hypothesis.
While the experiments allow us to test for LPA in a controlled setting, they cannot directly
speak to how individuals' preferences over actual redistributive policies vary as a function of their
place in the income distribution. We thus formulate tests of LPA using survey data on support for
minimum wage increases. The minimum wage, by denition, denes the \last-place" wage that can
be legally paid in most labor markets. As such, LPA would predict limited support for increasing
the minimum wage among those with wages just above the current minimum|while their wage
would likely increase to the new minimum, they might now have the \last-place" wage. We nd
exactly this pattern using data we collect from our own online survey and nd similar results using
surveys on the minimum wage published by the Pew Research Center.
The evidence from the money-transfer games as well as the minimum wage surveys highlights
why it might be surprisingly dicult to create a coalition in support of redistribution. Groups
close to the bottom of the distribution may only support policies that are rank-preserving, but
such policies may generate little enthusiasm among the lowest group. The minimum-wage results
suggest that even in cases where ranks are not reversed but merely condensed, redistribution may
nd little support among those who could previously think of themselves as distinctly above last
place.
Our results may also shed light on why certain risk-taking behaviors seem concentrated among
3lower socio-economic groups. Consistent with LPA, recent work has found that low-income individ-
uals are more likely to play lotteries in laboratory settings when they are primed to think about
their poverty (Haisley et al., 2008). Alternatively, poverty could lead to risk-taking behaviors such
as crime or early initiation of sexual activity because those who would be in \last place" by conven-
tional standards such as income begin to seek status based on alternative norms, as in the model
of Oxoby (2004).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple utility function
that allows for last-place aversion. Sections 3 and 4 describe, respectively, the lottery experiment
and the money-transfer experiments, and derive and test predictions from the model in Section 2.
Section 5 presents the results from survey data on minimum wage increases. Section 6 discusses the
potential implications of last-place aversion for behaviors beyond those we study in this paper and
oers concluding thoughts.
2 A simple model of last-place aversion
In this section, we dene a utility function that incorporates last-place aversion. The purpose of
this section is merely to describe the properties of this function, and not to explain why individuals
might be last-place averse. It might be an innate human trait, or it might be a conditioned response
to seeing that individuals in last place are treated poorly, or it might have an alternative origin.
We take LPA as given and incorporate it into a simple utility function, which we will later use to
generate predictions regarding how individuals will behave in dierent settings.
2.1 Individual utility under last-place aversion
Consider a nite number of individuals with income levels y1;y2;:::;yN, and let yL be the income
of the lowest-income person. Let the utility of person i be dened by:
u(yi) = (1   )f(yi) + 1(yi > yL); (1)
where f0 > 0, f00 < 0,  2 [0;1] and 1(yi > yL) is an indicator function that takes the value
of one if an individual is not in last place and zero if she is in last place. Essentially, utility is a
weighted average of a typical concave utility function and a bonus payment to all but the last-place
4individual. As  ! 0, the function approaches a standard, non-reference-dependent utility function,
and as  ! 1, the only factor that determines utility is whether one is in or out of last place. For
convenience, we will sometimes call the rst term the \standard term" of the utility function and
the second term the \LPA term" of the utility function.
Now, consider a small -perturbation in income for individuals i. If yi >> yL or yi = yL <<
yL+1, where yL+1 is the income of the second-to-last person, then the change in utility is merely
(1 )f0(yi). As such, LPA will typically not aect the decisions of an individual with income far
above that of the last-place person or a last-place person so far behind the next person that he can
never catch up.
In contrast, if yi   yL < , then a loss of  income|which would put individual i in last
place|yields a utility loss of (1   )f0(yi) + . Similarly, if yi = yL > yL+1   , then a gain of
, which would move i from last place, yields a utility gain of (1   )f0(yi) + . Therefore, as an
individual approaches the last-place person from above or as the last-place person approaches the
second-to-last-place person from below the change in the LPA term of the utility expression grows
relative to that of the standard term.
The analysis above suggests that for individuals in or close to last place, standard results may no
longer hold. For example, the last-place person should have a heightened tendency to accept gambles
that provide a possibility of rank improvement, whereas absolute risk-aversion is generally believed
to decrease with wealth (Arrow, 1971). Similarly, warm-glow models (Andreoni, 1990, Andreoni,
1989) predict that most people would choose to costlessly give money to a poorer individual, but
LPA would diminish this tendency for individuals who are themselves close to last place.
2.2 Discussion
In equation (1), there is an increase in utility associated with moving out of last place, and then
no further eect of relative position. An alternative utility function that captures the spirit of
last-place aversion could incorporate a more continuous function of relative position:
u(yi;ri) = f(yi) + g(ri); (2)
5where ri is individual i's relative position. Preferences similar to last-place aversion would be
reected in the shape of g|past work suggests that utility is increasing in relative position (g0 > 0)
but last-place aversion would suggest that g() is also concave and that its gradient is very large
for small values of r (i.e., for individuals close to the bottom of the distribution) but then quickly
attens out.
Such a g() function would be dicult to distinguish empirically from last-place aversion, espe-
cially in settings without a large number of distinct ranks. In general, our empirical work will not
focus on distinguishing last-place aversion from more general \low-rank" aversion that could be
generated by certain g() functions, but will seek to show that last-place or low-rank aversion can
be separately identied from a range of alternative hypotheses such as reference-dependent models
where the median acts as a reference point and inequality-aversion models.
3 Experimental evidence of last-place aversion: making risky choices
Although preferences over redistribution motivate the paper, the model in Section 2 also has direct
implications for individuals' willingness to bear risk. These predictions provide a useful opportunity
to test the model in a context outside of the one we originally sought to explain while oering
support for the impact of last-place aversion on a wider set of behaviors. In this section, we conduct
an experiment that tests whether individuals choose to bear risk in return for the possibility of
moving out of last place that they choose to forgo when placed in other parts of the distribution.
Our guiding principle in this and the later experiments is to create an environment that biases us
against nding LPA, so that any evidence we nd in support of the model would not be an artifact
of a particular aspect of our experimental design. First, as shame or embarrassment may motivate
individuals' desire to avoid last place, we take several steps to promote players' privacy during the
game. Players never interact face-to-face, but instead through computers, and they generate their
own screen names and are thus free to protect their identity. Each individual sits in a separate
carrel, with large blinders placed around each carrel, which should further enhance privacy and
anonymity. Players are not publicly paid at the end of the game and instead money is given to
them while they are still sitting in their carrels.
Second, all of the experiments involve an initial assignment to a rank, and we make clear to
6participants that this assignment is done randomly by a computer. We believe the emphasis on
random assignment should diminish LPA by discouraging players from associating rank and merit.
3.1 Data and experimental design
Participants (N = 72) sign up by registering online at the Harvard Business School Computer Lab
for Experimental Research (CLER). See Appendix Table 1 for demographic summary statistics
as well as more detailed information on eligibility requirements for registration and payment of
participants.
We randomly divide participants into twelve groups of six in order to play a multi-round game.
At the beginning of the game, the computer randomly assigns each player in the group a rank, and
endows them with an amount of money that corresponds to that rank. The monetary endowment
decreases by 25 cents for each lower rank, such that the player in rst place receives $3.00, the
player in second place receives $2.75 and the player in sixth place receives $1.75. Ranks and actual
dollar amounts of all players are common knowledge and clearly displayed throughout the game.
Next, participants play a series of rounds. At the start of each round, the computer presents an
identical two-option choice set to all players in the game. The rst option adds a stated amount
of money to a player's balance with probability one. The second option oers participants the
opportunity to play a two-outcome lottery, whereby they gain a stated amount with probability
3=4 and lose a stated amount with probability 1=4. After players have submitted their choices, the
computer makes independent draws from the common P(win) = 3=4 probability distribution for
each player who chose the lottery and adds the risk-free amount to the balance of each player who
did not choose the lottery. The new balances and ranks are displayed and the game repeats. We
include the instructions as well as a typical screen-shot of the game in Appendix A.
Each round, the payos associtated with the two options are calculated in a particular manner.
The payment players can receive with probability one is always equal to half the dierence between
the current balance of the last-place player and the second-to-last-place player. The \winning"
payment of the lottery is always equal to the dierence between the current balances of the last-
place and the fourth-place player. The \losing" outcome of the lottery is set so that the lottery and
the certain payment oered in the rst option are equal in expected value.5
5Let 6;5;4 be the current balances of the sixth- (last-) place player, the fth-place player, and the fourth-place
7The payos are designed so that last-place players always have the opportunity to accept a
gamble that oers the possibility of moving out of last place, holding all other players' balances
constant, and, usually, even if the second-to-last-place player took the certain amount.6 In contrast,
taking the certain amount never allows the last-place player to improve his rank, holding other
player balances constant, and in fact only allows a rank improvement if the second-to-last player
chooses the lottery and loses.
As an example, consider a round in which players begin with the following balances: $6, $6.50,
$7, $7.50, $8, $8.50. They would then all receive the following instructions:
In this round, which would you prefer?
(i) Win $.25 with 100 percent probability.
(ii) Win $1.00 with 75 percent probability and lose $2.00 with 25 percent probability.
As described above, the two options have identical expected values (0:75  1   0:25  2 = 0:25).
Similarly, the certain payment is half the dierence between the two lowest-ranked players' balances
(0:5(6:50 6) = 0:25) and the winning amount of the lottery is the dierence between the fourth-
ranked and last-place player (7   6 = 1).
Each game consists of nine rounds, but participants are not told how many rounds the game
entails to avoid end eects.7 Participants are told that one randomly selected player will be paid
his balance from one randomly selected round. Note that while every game begins with the initial
winning prize of the gamble set at $.50, in all subsequent rounds the prize depends on the outcomes
of past rounds and tends to grow over time as the dierences between ranks grow in terms of
absolute dollars. The average winning prize in the nal (ninth) round is $6.00.8
player, respectively. We dene the payment individuals can receive with probability one as certain =
5 6
2 and the
payment individuals receive if they win the lottery as win = 4 6. Thus lose is determined by setting the expected




4lose = certain. Note that certain need not be a whole
number and in such cases we round up to the nearest penny.
6If x equals the balance the sixth-place player will have in the next round conditional on winning the gamble,
and y the balance of the fth-place player if he takes the certain amount, then x > y , 4 > 5 +
5 6
2 , 24 >
35   6 , 2(4   5) > 5   6. This condition holds in over 58 percent of the rounds.
7In many experimental settings, subjects play dierently when they know they are playing the nal round of the
game. See Rapoport and Dale (1966) for an early treatment of so-called \end eects."
8The fact that the average prize in the nal round rounds to a a whole dollar is merely a coincidence: after the
rst or second round, the algorithm for determining the s based on the balances of the sixth-, fth- and fourth-
place players rarely produces round dollar amounts or even amounts that are multiples of ve or ten cents. As a
consequence, the math involved in any optimization becomes more dicult as the game progresses.
8The game generates considerable shuing between ranks. For example, the median player ex-
periences four distinct ranks throughout a game and the average round results in 57 percent of
players having a dierent rank than they did the previous round.
3.2 Predictions
Below, we discuss how the model in Section 2 predicts players of dierent ranks will decide whether
to choose the lottery over the certain payment. To demonstrate the basic intuition, we will assume
in this section that players make their decision either holding other players' balances constant or
believing that other players are playing a xed strategy. In Appendix B, we generate the same
predictions by solving for the Nash equilibrium of the game.
3.2.1 Last-place player
Consider the decision of the last-place player with balance y = yL and utility function as described
in Section 2. Holding other players' balances constant, he chooses to gamble whenever:
(1   )(1
4f(y   lose) + 3
4f(y + win)) + 3




> f(y + certain)   (1
4f(y   lose) + 3
4f(y + win)): (3)
As  ! 1, and thus LPA increases, his propensity to gamble grows. As the s are set such
that two decisions have equal expected value, the right-hand side of equation (3) is merely the
utility of a certain quantity minus the expected utility of a lottery with equal expected value and
is thus always positive so long as individuals are risk averse. Therefore, as risk-aversion falls the
right-hand-side goes to zero and the propensity to gamble also increases.
3.2.2 Second-to-last-place player
The second-to-last-place player should never gamble if he assumes that the last-place player never
gambles|he gains nothing from the LPA term of the utility expression and any amount of risk-
aversion should lead him to reject the gamble based on the standard term of the utility expression.
9Now, suppose the second-to-last-place player assumes the last-place player always gambles.







or, after some algebra,
9
16(1   )
> f(y + certain)   (3
4f(y   lose) + 1
4f(y + win)): (4)
Therefore, again, for  suciently close to one, the second-to-last player will always take the
gamble under the specied assumptions. Whether, for the same , he will more often gamble than
the last-place player depends on how quickly absolute risk aversion diminishes|while the left-hand
side of equation (3) is always greater than that of equation (4), the right-hand side of equation (4)
is smaller than that of equation (3) so long as absolute risk aversion diminishes with income.
3.2.3 Other players
By construction win allows the last-place player to attain the current earnings of the fourth-place
player, so choosing the certain option of certain will always allow the fourth-place player to remain
at least higher than the current last-place player. Thus, there is no reason for her to bear the risk
of the gamble and she will take the certain option. By the same logic, so will everyone above her.
3.2.4 Summary of predictions
The last-place player will gamble given suciently high values of , the weight on the last-place-
aversion term of the utility expression. Similarly, for suciently large  as well as a belief that the
last-place player will gamble, the second-to-last-place player will also gamble. In Appendix B, we
show that these two players will each play a mixed strategy between choosing the lottery and the
certain payment, whereas all other players will choose the certain payment.
Of course, participants may have considerations beyond their actual payos when deciding
between the lottery and the certain payment. For example, they may choose the lottery merely
because adding an element of chance makes the game less boring. Alternatively, players may care
10about rank beyond merely avoiding last place, and choose to gamble in the middle of higher parts of
the distribution in order to catch the person above them. As such, some higher-ranked players will
likely choose the lottery as well, but LPA predicts that the last- and second-to-last-place players
should do so at measurably higher rates.
3.3 Results
3.3.1 Basic graphs
Figure 1 shows the share of individuals who choose to gamble, by their rank at the time they make
the decision. The rst series includes all rounds of play. The highest-ranked four players choose the
lottery option at very similar rates|just over 40 percent of the time. The last two players, however,
gamble at a higher rate|the fth-place player chooses the lottery just over sixty percent of the
time and the last-place player just under sixty percent.
The second series excludes observations from the rst two rounds, as players may need time
to understand how the game works even after hearing the instructions. Given past work showing
preferences are more stable as subjects gain experience, we will often show results with the rst two
rounds excluded in addition to results with all rounds included.9 The patterns are all very similar,
though in general players seem to gamble at slightly higher rates in the rst few rounds. The higher
gambling rates may reect the fact that the absolute value of the stakes tend to rise as the game
unfolds, though they may also reect players simply \trying out their luck" in the beginning of a
game.
Figure 1 also plots p-values from comparing the decisions made at each rank to those made by
the last- and second-to-last place player. These results are based on OLS regressions with standard
errors clustered by player.10 All but one are signicant at the ten-percent level (the exception
is rank = 4 when the rst two rounds are excluded, with p = 0:157). Overall, these results are
consistent with our predictions that the two lowest-ranked players will bear the cost of additional
risk in an attempt to escape or avoid last place.
9See Carlsson (2010) for a discussion and review of literature on why preferences may be more stable as subjects
gain experience, and Slonim and Roth (1998) for an example of learning throughout the rounds of the ultimatum
game.





i + i; where rank
k
i is an indicator variable
for player i having rank k. The omitted group is players in last or second-to-last place (ranks 5 and 6).
11Regression results
Table 1 displays results from probit regression analysis. Col. (1) shows that the basic result from
Figure 1 holds when round xed eects are included. Players in fth or last-place gamble at a
signicantly higher rate than more highly ranked players, and this eect remains after excluding
the rst two rounds (col. 2).
Col. (3) includes only the rst round. While there may indeed be more noise in the rst round,
one reason to focus on it is that it is the only round where ranks are determined purely via random
assignment and are not in part the consequence of past play. Including only the rst round increases
the coecient on the variable of interest.
Col. (4) includes all rounds, but adds controls for players' current balance, as well as the \win-
ning payment" of the lottery and the \certain payment" they can instead receive with probability
one.11 Including these controls increases the magnitude of the coecient of interest slightly, relative
to that in col. (1).
A potential confound in the game is that the winning amount of the lottery is equal to the
dierence between the fourth-place and last-place players' balances and thus is not set based on
higher-ranked players' ability to move up in rank. We can test whether this confound is driving the
heightened tendencies of the lowest-ranked players to gamble by focusing only on the rst round,
where the balance dierences between players are all equal and thus the lottery provides all players
outside of rst place the same opportunity to move up in rank. As seen in col. (3), the coecient
of interest is actually larger in this sample.
We nonetheless further probe this potential confound in col. (5) by explicitly controlling for
whether a player could \catch" the next player: that is, for whether the winning amount is greater
than the gap between him and the player above him. As this variable is only dened for those with
a player above them, we exclude the rst-place player. Comparing cols. (4) and (5) shows that the
coecient of interest is unchanged|in fact, the slight decrease in col. (5) is entirely due to the
dierent sample (running the col. 4 specication on the col. 5 sample yields a coecient of 0.419).
As this control does not aect the variable of interest and requires us to drop the rst-place player,
11Note that current balances vary at the individual level, while the latter two variables vary at the round-game
level. As such, all variables can be identied even though the regressions always include round xed eects.
12we exclude it from the rest of the regressions.12
In col. (6) we explore whether the eect on the last-place and fth-place players predicted by the
LPA model can be separated from a more general eect of being below the median. We will return
to this question throughout the paper, as we seek to separate LPA from models where individuals
merely want to be in the top half of the distribution. While adding an indicator variable for being
below the median in the six-person distribution (i.e., in fourth, fth or last place) reduces the
coecient of interest slightly from its level in col. (5), it remains positive and highly signicant.
In col. (7) we test whether the eects that we interpret as LPA can instead be explained by in-
equality aversion. Following Fehr and Schmidt (1999), we assume that for player i \disadvantageous"
inequality is proportional to
P
j6=i maxfxj xi;0g and \advantageous" inequality is proportional to
P
j6=i maxfxi   xj;0g, and that the two types of inequality can have dierent eects on individual
utility. We then calculate the expected value of the two terms under two scenarios: (1) player i
plays the lottery and all other players take the safe option; (2) player i takes the safe option, as
do all other players. For each player, we calculate the dierence in disadvantageous (advantageous)
inequality under these two scenarios, and use this dierence as a proxy for the net eect of his
decision on disadvantageous (advantageous) inequality.
The results in col. (7) suggest that these controls have no eect on the propensity of the last two
players to play the lottery. While neither of the coecients is signicant, we note that the estimated
eect of disadvantageous inequality is not of the expected sign|when playing the lottery would
seem to increase disadvantageous inequality, players are slightly more likely to choose the lottery
regardless.13
In col. (8) we evaluate LPA versus a more general model where rank has a continuous eect
on utility, as described in equation (2). While the two eects are jointly signicant (p = 0:002),
neither is individually signicant at conventional levels, though the \last or fth place" dummy is
12Readers may wonder why we designed the game in such a way that this confound would exist. The alternative
would be setting the lottery payos dierently for each rank. However, doing so then introduces its own confound,
that any dierences across rank in the probability of choosing the lottery could be driven by the fact that the lotteries
themselves are in fact dierent across ranks.
13We experimented with many other specications to explore the potential eects of inequality aversion, all of
which are available upon request. We calculated the dierences in the inequality-aversion terms assuming that: (1)
player i plays the lottery while all j 6= i have their balance held constant, which might be an approximation that
players use; (2) that player i wins the lottery while all j 6= i takes the certain payment; (3) that i wins while all j's
are held constant. We also simply included the level of each player's advantageous and disadvantageous inequality at
the start of each round. In none of these specications does the coecient on the eect of being in the lowest two
ranks drop below 0.43.
13far closer (p = 0:193 versus p = 0:384). With only six ranks, it is dicult to precisely estimate
the eect of both a linear rank term and an indicator variable for being in the bottom two ranks.
Moreover, as we show in Appendix Table 2, when only the rst round|which is based on pure
random assignment| is included, the eect of being in the bottom two ranks is highly signicant
even when linear rank is included.
Appendix Table 2 shows that the coecients of interest in the key Table 1 specications increase
when demographic controls are added, relative to specications estimated on the same sample but
without demographic controls. The only demographic variable that is itself signicant is political
orientation, with more liberal participants less likely to choose the lottery. The table also shows
that the results are robust to including individual xed eects in a conditional logit estimation. We
do not emphasize these results because the specication uses no between-participant variation, and
it is the between-participant variation that is at least initially driven by pure random assignment.
The nal three columns show that when only the rst round is included, LPA can be separately
distinguished from not only a linear-rank eect, as noted in the previous paragraph, but also a
below-the-median eect and inequality aversion.
We also investigated whether the coecient of interest was larger among certain subgroups,
though we do not report the results. We found no statistically signicant patterns, though insu-
cient power is likely a hindrance. The interaction term that comes closest to statistical signicance
(p = 0:117) suggests that being religious may mitigate the tendency of low-ranked players to choose
the lottery.
3.4 A note on the dynamic design of the game
We chose to design the experiment as a dynamic game, where the outcomes in all rounds except the
rst are determined in part by the decisions individuals made in the previous round, as opposed
to re-randomizing balances each round. This design better mimics the dynamics of the income
distribution, where individuals may be able to improve their position slightly from year to year on
the basis of sound decisions or luck. Re-randomization, in contrast, would imply that a millionaire
and a minimum-wage worker would have the same expected income the following year.
There are two drawbacks to this decision. First, variation in rank is in part endogenous. While
not ideal, this endogeneity does not appear to matter greatly in practice. As shown in col. (3),
14the last-place eect is actually larger in the rst round, when rank is purely a function of random
assignment, suggesting our results are not being driven by this endogeneity. It likely has limited
eect because half the players choose the lottery each round, creating a large random component
to players' balances and ranks even after the rst round.
The second drawback is that the dynamic setting makes it more dicult to draw sharp pre-
dictions from the model. Given that players are paid based on one randomly chosen round and
that they do not know when the game will end, they should weigh both the immediate eect of
their decision on the subsequent round as well as the eect on later rounds. They likely weigh
the immediate eects more heavily as they know the current distribution with certainty and can
only guess at the distribution in later rounds. Moreover, past work has shown that players tend to
maximize current payos even in multi-round games where the payo is explicitly based on the nal
balance.14 We thus, as readers may have noted, derive our predictions in Section 3.2 and Appendix
B assuming that players play each round as if it is the one that \counts," though obviously that is
a simplifying approximation.
3.5 Discussion
The evidence from this experiment provides support for the predictions of the last-place-aversion
model. The last-place player chooses to bear additional risk for the opportunity to move up in rank,
and the second-to-last-place player chooses to bear risk in order to defend his current position. We
also nd no evidence that the results can better be explained by players' desire to be in the top
half of the distribution. Players in rst through fourth place exhibit almost identical tendencies to
choose the lottery over the risk-free payment. As such, a prospect-theory model where the reference
point is the middle of the distribution|so that individuals below the reference are risk-loving and
those above risk-averse|would not appear to explain the results.
The results in this section contrast with the standard result that absolute risk-aversion dimin-
ishes with wealth, and with experimental ndings that individuals exhibit diminishing absolute risk
14Benartzi and Thaler (1995) argue that due to myopia and mental accounting, individuals maximize current
payos even in settings where the salient outcome is the nal future payo. Gneezy and Potters (1997) show that
individuals tend to maximize over an \evaluation period." Since we inform all players of the new balances each round,
each round is an evaluation period in our experiment and thus players would play each game as if it is one-shot.
Camerer et al. (1993) use software that allows them to record the information players are viewing as they play a game.
They conclude that even in a sequential game that is relatively simple to solve via backward induction, \subjects
concentrated on the current round when making decisions."
15aversion with respect to laboratory earnings.15 In our experiment, the two players with the lowest
earnings play the lottery most often. Our results thus suggest that the relationship between wealth
and risk-aversion may depend on whether individuals view wealth in an absolute or relative sense.
4 Experimental evidence of last-place aversion: preferences over redistribution
In this section, we return to our original motivation, determining how relative position aects
individuals' preference for redistributive policies. We present two experiments that explore how
support for redistribution toward either the last-place player, or toward lower-placed players more
generally, vary by rank. The rst experiment better mimics common redistributive policies|where
general revenue is raised from the entire population and then directed to the least well-o|but
is a less demanding test of the last-place aversion model. The second experiment provides a more
demanding test of last-place aversion but does not have an obvious policy parallel.
4.1 First money-transfer game: redistribution toward the last-place player
4.1.1 Experimental design
As in the lottery game, the game begins with players (N = 24, divided into four six-player games)
being randomly assigned dollar amounts, in this case $1, $2,...,$6. As before, the ranks and current
balances of all players are common knowledge throughout the game.
Each player is then given a choice between receiving an extra dollar for herself, or having the
last-place player receive an extra two dollars. In both cases, the money comes from a separate
account and not from the player or any other player. Given that this choice is not well-dened for
the last-place player himself, we give him the choice between keeping the dollar and giving money
to the second-to-last-place player. As only his choice does not involve giving to a less-well-o player,
we generally do not focus on his decision. The instructions and a typical screen-shot from the game
appear in Appendix C.
After players make their decisions, one player is randomly chosen and his choice determines
the nal payos of that round. As such, players should make their decisions as if they alone will
determine the nal distribution of the round. Players do not know which player is chosen each
15See, for example, Levy (1994) for evidence of diminishing absolute risk aversion in laboratory settings.
16round or the outcome of the round. After the end of each round, players are re-randomized across
the same $1, $2,...,$6 distribution and the game repeats. Players are not told how many rounds
there will be, but in practice each game consisted of nine rounds, where the rst is a practice round.
They are paid their nal balances for one randomly chosen round.
4.1.2 Changes from the lottery experiment
We decided to make several changes based on experience from the lottery experiment. First, in this
and the later redistribution experiments, we re-randomize balances after each round, making the
experiment a series of one-shot games as opposed to the dynamic design of the lottery experiment.
While, as noted earlier, re-randomization poorly captures the dynamics of the income distribution, it
allows us to draw predictions without having to make assumptions regarding players' time horizons.
Second, instead of implementing all players' decisions simultaneously, after each round one
player is randomly chosen to have his decision implemented, so a player need not take into account
other players' decisions when making his own decision. We made this design choice largely to follow
existing literature, where risk-taking in group settings is often investigated using game shows and
other competitions, where strategic concerns are salient, but preferences over redistribution are
often elicited using Dictator games, where players need not consider the actions of others.16
4.1.3 Predictions
Standard utility maximization would predict that all players keep the additional dollar themselves.
Models in which players try to maximize total surplus would predict all players forgo the $1 in
order to create two dollars for the last-place player. Reference-dependent models might predict
that players' behavior changes once they have reached a certain reference point, such as the median
of the distribution. Inequality aversion as parameterized in the Fehr-Schmidt model predicts that
the probability of keeping the additional dollar is decreasing in rank.17
16See Gertner (1993) and Metrick (1995) for two early papers using game shows to investigate risk-aversion. See
Camerer (2003) for a review of past work using the Dictator game to elicit redistributive preferences. Of course, we
cannot know for sure whether players still think about what other players are likely to do when they make their own
decisions, even though we emphasize in the instructions that if they are chosen only their decision is implemented.
17Recall that the Fehr-Schmidt model assumes that individuals are especially sensitive to \disadvantageous in-
equality," which is proportional to
P
j6=i maxfxj  xi;0g. For the rst-place player, keeping the dollar has no eect on
this sum; for the second place player, keeping it decreases the sum by one; for the third-place player, by two, and so
on. Forgoing the additional dollar increases the sum by one for the second-to-last-place player (the last-place player
now has $1 than he does) and by two for the last-place player (the second-to-last-place player now has $3 more than
17Last-place aversion predicts that the second-to-last-place player will be the least likely to forgo
the $1, as doing so would result in his moving to last place. The empirical work that follows attempts
to separate LPA from the models described above.
4.1.4 Results
Figure 2 plots the probability a participant forgoes the extra $1, by the participant's rank. As
before, we show results for all rounds as well as results when the rst two rounds are removed, as
players may need a few rounds to understand the game. The p-values|based on an OLS regression
with the second-to-last player the omitted category|are also plotted. For completeness, we include
the sixth-place player in this gure, even though her choice is not parallel to that of all other ranks.
The shape of Figure 2 is broadly consistent with the predictions of LPA. The top half of the
distribution is most likely to sacrice for the benet of the last-place player|roughly forty percent
of the time, players in these positions forgo the extra dollar for themselves so that the last-place
player can receive an additional $2. This tendency falls slightly for the fourth-place player and is
lowest for the second-to-last-place player, who forgoes the extra dollar only ten percent of the time.
As documented by the p-values on the gure, the pairwise dierences between the second-to-last-
place player and more highly-ranked players are generally statistically signicant.
Table 2 shows results from probit regression analysis. All regressions include round xed eects
and a dummy variable for the last-place player, since her choice is not parallel to other ranks. Col.
(1) shows that, relative to all other higher ranks, the second-to-last-place player is signicantly less
likely to forgo the additional dollar. In col. (2), the eect increases after excluding the rst two
rounds.
Col. (3) shows that controlling for whether a player is currently below the median substantially
reduces this eect, though col. (4) shows that after the rst two rounds the eect of being in
second-to-last place regains its signicance.
Cols. (5) and (6) explore the eect of inequality aversion. As in the previous section, we cal-
culate the change in advantageous and disadvantageous inequality when a person decides to forgo
versus keep the additional dollar. Given the payos of the game, these two variables are a linear
he does), but has no eect for higher-ranked players. Therefore, the net eect of keeping the additional dollar is to
decrease disadvantageous inequality by 0, 1, 2, 3, 5, and 7 for, respectively, players in ranks one through six.
18transformation of each other, so we only include the change in disadvantageous inequality. The
coecient suggests that the greater the net increase in disadvantageous inequality associated with
forgoing the additional dollar, the more likely players will keep the dollar. As noted earlier, the
net eect on disadvantageous inequality from forgoing the dollar is decreasing in rank, so it is not
surprising that including this measure in col. (5) reduces the eect of being in second-to-last place.
In col. (6) the rst two rounds are excluded and the coecient of interest regains its signicance.
In cols. (7) and (8) we see whether the eect of being in second-to-last place can be separated
from a general linear trend in rank. Including this measure in col. (7) reduces the coecient on the
second-to-last-place indicator from its magnitude in col. (8), but it regains its statistical signicant
in col. (6) when the rst two rounds are excluded.
In Appendix Table 3 we show that adding covariates to the main Table 2 specications always
increases the magnitude of the eect of being in second-to-last place. It also shows the main result
holds when a player-xed-eect model is estimated via conditional logit. We prefer the estimates
in Table 2 because with only eight rounds, ranks are not balanced across players and thus between-
player variation is still useful.
Allowing the second-to-last-place coecient to vary for dierent subgroups of the data does not
yield any evidence that certain groups are driving the eect. In regressions where we interact the
second-to-last-place variable with, sequentially, gender, age, political views and religious views, the
coecients on the interaction terms are never close to conventional levels of signcance.
4.1.5 Discussion
The results from this rst redistribution are generally consistent with last-place aversion. The
second-to-last player is indeed the least generous to the last-place player. While we cannot always
separate this eect from a below-the-median eect, inequality aversion, or a more general eect
of rank, given the small sample size (this experiment was the least well attended of all four that
we conducted) even a small amount of noise would make such a separation dicult. When early
rounds|which we suspect are noisier as players are still learning the game|are removed, the eect
of being in second-to-last place can be distinguished from these alternative stories.
Given that many redistributive or poverty-alleviation policies (e.g., food stamps, Medicaid,
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families) raise revenue from the general population and then
19transfer it to the least well-o, studying individuals' tendency to transfer money to a last-place
player may indeed help explain variation across the income distribution in support for redistributive
policies. But while this game might approximate typical policies, it has at least one important
limitation in testing last-place aversion as a more general theory of behavior. The game potentially
confounds disutility regarding moving down in rank with any last-place-aversion eect since only
the fth-place player actually moves down in rank by giving the $2 to the last-place person. This
confounding eect might also impact the decision of the fourth-place person, since giving the last-
place person $2 means she would now be tied with the formerly last-place person for second-to-last
place. Players in all other ranks never move down in the distribution by forgoing the $1. We thus
design a game that tests how sensitivity to moving down a rank varies by rank.
4.2 Second redistribution game
The objective of this game is not to mimic any particular redistributive policy, but rather to test
last-place aversion in a more demanding setting. This game focuses on how individuals treat the
players directly above and below them, and how these decisions vary by rank.
4.2.1 Experimental design
The game is identical to the rst money-transfer game (players are randomly assigned across dollar
amounts $1, $2,...,$6; there is re-randomization after each round; decisions are completely con-
dential; players do not learn the outcome of the round) except we change the two redistributive
outcomes between which players must choose. Each player ranked two through ve must choose
between giving the player directly above or directly below them an additional $2. The rst-place
player decides between the second- and third-place player, and the last-place player decides be-
tween the fourth- and fth-place player. These choice sets are summarized in Table 3. As before,
the additional $2 comes from a separate account and not from the player herself. In the interest
of space, we do not show a screen-shot of this game but, aside from the dierent choice sets, it is
identical to that of the rst money-transfer game.
204.2.2 Predictions
Unlike the previous money-transfer game, this game does not allow players to keep extra money
themselves. Their choice set is limited to giving an extra $2 to one of two other players. As such,
pure self-interest does not obviously push them toward one choice or the other, as their balance
remains at its initial level regardless of their decision. Furthermore, because total surplus is held
constant, players do not face an equity-eciency trade-o, as in Engelmann and Strobel (2004).
Inequality aversion would predict that all players in ranks one through ve give to the lower-
ranked player. In fact, the game is constructed so that the net eect of giving to the lower-ranked
person on the standard Fehr-Schmidt inequality terms is constant for ranks one through ve.18 As
such, any variation among these ve ranks in the probability of giving to the lower-ranked player
cannot be explained by standard inequality aversion.
By construction, giving to the lower-ranked player in their choice set causes all players except
the rst and last to drop one rank in the distribution. LPA predicts that dropping in rank would
have the largest psychic cost for the second-to-last-place player, and thus we predict that individuals
will be the least likely to give to the lower-ranked player when they themselves are in second-to-last
place.
4.2.3 Initial results
Figure 3 shows how the probability a player gives the additional $2 to the lower-ranked player in his
choice set varies by rank. Overall, players choose to give to the lower-ranked player in their choice
set 75 percent of the time. This probability varies from over eighty percent in the top half of the
distribution, to less than sixty percent for the second-to-last place player. Players are the least likely
18To see this, note that for ranks two through ve, giving to the lower-ranked player increases disadvantageous
inequality by one, whereas giving to the higher-ranked player increases it by two, so the net eect of giving to the
lower- versus higher-ranked player is a decrease in disadvantageous inequality of one. For rank one, giving to the
higher-ranked player in the choice set (rank two) increases disadvantageous inequality by one, whereas giving to
the lower-ranked player (rank three) does not change it, so for the rst-place player the net eect of giving to the
lower-ranked player is to decrease disadvantageous inequality by one. For advantageous inequality, ranks two through
ve decrease this term by one if they give to the lower-ranked player and have no eect on it if they give to the
higher-ranked player, so the net eect of giving to the lower-ranked player is a decrease of one. The rst-place player
decreases advantageous inequality by two if he gives to the lower-ranked player and by one if he gives to the higher-
ranked player, so the net eect of giving to the lower-ranked player is a decrease of one. To summarize, for ranks
one through ve, the net eect of giving to the lower-ranked player is to decrease disadvantageous and advantageous
inequality by one. As players are assumed to dislike both types of inequality, inequality-aversion would suggest that
all these players always give to the lower-ranked player in their choice set.
21to give to the last-place player when they are in second-to-last place and this dierence is pairwise
signicant for the rst-, third- and last-place players, and marginally signicant (p = 0:120) for the
second-place player. Those ranked fourth are nearly equally likely to deny the $2 to the lower-ranked
player, though the dierence grows somewhat when the rst two rounds are eliminated.
The rst- and last-place players are the most likely to give to the lower-ranked player in their
choice set, consistent with their not facing an equality-rank trade-o. The rst-place player is the
most likely to give to the lower-ranked player|concerns over rank and inequality both push him
toward giving money to the third- instead of the second-place player. The player in the bottom half
of the distribution most likely to give to the lower-ranked player in his choice set is the last-place
player, consistent with his being able to give money to the lower-ranked player without changing
his rank, as he remains in last place regardless of his decision.
Table 4 presents probit regression results. In all cases, round xed eects and separate dummy
variables for the rst- and last-place players are included, since these two players do not have
parallel choice sets to those of other ranks. Col. (1) shows that adding round xed-eects does
not change the general patterns in Figure 3. The fth-place player is less generous than the other
ranks. However, col. (2) shows that, as in the gure, this eect is largely driven by players in the
bottom half of the distribution (again, excluding the last-place player) being less likely to give to
the lower-ranked player.
A key challenge in separating any last-place-aversion eect from competing hypotheses is that
with only six ranks we have limited degrees of freedom. This problem is aggravated in the current
game relative to the the earlier ones because only ranks two through ve have comparable choice
sets, whereas in the rst redistribution game we could compare ranks one through ve and in
the lottery game ranks one through six. Being able to compare only four ranks makes it nearly
impossible to separate, say, a story in which individuals dislike being near last place versus one in
which they want to be above the median. For this reason, we decided to re-run the experiment with
eight players.
4.2.4 Results from the eight-player game
The game is exactly parallel to the six-player game described in Section 4.2.1. Players in ranks two
through seven must decide between giving $2 to the person directly above them or below them,
22and the rst-place player decides between the second- and third-place players while the last-place
player decides between the sixth- and seventh-place players. As before, we also control separately
for players in rst or last place as their choice set is not parallel to that of other players.
Figure 4 is the analogue of Figure 3 and presents the basic results from the eight-player game.
As before, the second-to-last-place player is the least likely to give to the player below him, and
this dierence is often pair-wise signicant from other ranks. Also as before, the third-to-last-place
player is relatively unlikely to give to the player below him. Importantly, however, the player just
below the median (rank = 5) shows no such tendency, and the pairwise dierence with the second-
to-last-place player is statistically signicant. Put dierently, comparing the six- and eight-player
games suggests that there is nothing particularly salient about being, say, in fourth or fth place,
but instead behavior appears to depend on how close one is to last place: the fourth- and fth-place
players in the six-player game show strong evidence of LPA, while the fourth- and fth-place players
in the eight-player game do not.19
Cols. (3) through (11) of Table 4 present probit regression results from the eight-player game.
Consistent with the gure, in col. (3) the second-to-last-place player is signicantly less likely to
give to the lower-ranked player than all other players (though, again, the rst- and last-place players
always have their own xed eect, so their generally higher tendency to give to the lower-ranked
player is not contributing to the coecient). In col. (4) we gain precision by including those in third-
to-last place as being aected by last-place aversion: if they give $2 to the lower-ranked player, they
would fall into second-to-last place. This eect increases when the rst two rounds are discarded.
For the remainder of the table, we will focus on distinguishing this eect|the aversion to falling
to the bottom two ranks of the distribution|from alternative hypotheses.
The next two columns explore the hypothesis that players are simply less likely to give to a
lower-ranked player when they themselves are below the median, which we could not distinguish
from last-place aversion in the six-player game. In contrast, the below-the-median indicator in col.
(6) is small in magnitude and statistically insignicant and the estimated eect of being in the
bottom of the distribution increases relative to the estimate in col. (4). Removing the early rounds
(col. 7) only increases the magnitude of the coecient of interest.
19Interestingly, in both the six- and eight-players games, the second-place player is one of the least likely ranks to
give to the player below him. We speculate that there may be some utility gained from remaining close to rst place
in rank, even though he would be further away in terms of absolute dollars.
23Cols. (8) and (9) test whether inequality aversion can explain the reluctance of those close to
last place from giving the $2 to the lower-ranked player. As noted earlier, inequality aversion in
the standard two-term Fehr-Shmidt parameterization cannot explain the results, as the decision
of each player in ranks two through seven has the same eect on the two terms. As such, we test
whether players respond to how the Gini coecient of the overall distribution changes when they
give to the higher- versus lower-ranked of the two people in their choice set. The positive coecient
on this variable indicates that the greater this dierence, the more players give to the lower-ranked
player, suggesting that, all else equal, players wish to make the distribution more equal. However,
this eect is not statistically signicant, and including it only increases the estimated eect of being
second or third from last.20
Cols. (10) and (11) test whether including a linear rank term diminishes the estimated eect
of avoiding the bottom of the distribution. Again, the coecient on the indicator for being second
or third from last increases. Although the p-value in col. (11) grows slightly, to 0.102, having only
eight ranks from which to identify a linear eect of rank and three indicator variables (for being
in last, for being in rst, and for being in sixth- or seventh-place) likely limits the precision with
which any single eect can be measured. When the rst two rounds are excluded, the coecient
on the variable of interest regains its signicance. Finally, cols. (12) and (13) presents the baseline
result when both the six- and eight-player games are included.
Appendix Table 4 shows that the main results are robust to adding demographic controls and
including player xed eects. Those who report being liberal are signicantly more likely to give
to the lower-ranked player, as are those who report being religious, though that eect is only
marginally signicant. Unlike the previous experiments, a few interaction terms are signicant.
While on average those who are religious are more likely to give to the lower-ranked player, religiosity
is associated with greater last-place-aversion eects|that is, religious individuals' relative tendency
to give to the lower-placed player is substantially reduced when they themselves are close to last
place. Younger players also appear to be more last-place averse.
20Readers may wonder why we control for this Gini variable in this table but not in Table 2. The reason is
that for players of ranks one through ve in the rst redistribution experiment, the dierence in the Gini coecient
from keeping the $1 versus transferring $2 to the last-place player is itself a linear function of rank. In particular,
Gini = 0:318   0:0152  rank. As such, for the ve ranks with comparable choice sets in the rst redistribution
experiment, we cannot separately identify the eect of rank and changes in the Gini coecient, so we only consider
rank.
244.3 Discussion
The results using the eight-player design oer broad support for the hypothesis that players expe-
rience disutility from being in the bottom of the distribution. This eect can be separated from
players' merely wanting to be above the median as well as from inequality aversion. Both the six-
and eight-player games suggest that players take steps to avoid falling not just to the very bottom
rank, but to the second-lowest rank as well.
It is worth emphasizing that in the second redistribution game those close to last place are
willing to take measures that typically have high psychological cost in order to avoid falling closer
to last place. As Tricomi et al. (2010) show, in both subjective ratings and fMRI data, the poorer
member in a two-player game evaluates transfers to the richer member more negatively than the
richer person evaluates transfers to the poorer person. Indeed, in the middle of the distribution
the participants in our experiments generally make decisions consistent with this nding. However,
between a quarter and a half of those in second-to-last place prefer to give the $2 to a person
who already has more money than they do, suggesting that last-place aversion can outweigh the
general aversion to giving money to a richer person found in other games and in other parts of the
distribution in our experiment.
The evidence supporting last-place aversion is especially striking given that our experiments
oer players condentiality and anonymity, as well as emphasize that rank is based on random
assignment and not merit. While we believe that these conditions allow us to test for last-place
aversion in a more rigorous manner, they may limit the experiments' connection to how individuals'
support for redistributive public policies depends on their actual economic position, as economic
position is typically not randomly assigned nor completely condential. The remainder of the paper
explores last-place aversion outside the laboratory, using survey data on minimum wage policy.
5 Last-place aversion and support for minimum wage increases
In choosing a \real-world" policy to test the predictions of last-place aversion, we select the mini-
mum wage over other redistributive policies for several reasons. First, the minimum wage denes
the \last-place" wage that can legally be paid in most labor markets, so it allows us to dene \last
place" more easily than in the context of other policies. Second, while the worst-o workers are not
25always those being paid the minimum wage (e.g., middle-class teenagers might take minimum-wage
jobs during the summer), past work has found that policies that more explicitly target the poor
such as Temporary Assistance for Needy Families could have potentially confounding racial asso-
ciations.21 Third, through spillover eects to other low-wage workers, the minimum wage plays an
important role in the compensation of low-income workers and thus analyzing its political support
has potentially important policy consequences.22
5.1 Predicting who would support a minimum wage increase
A minimum wage increase is a transfer to some low-wage workers from|depending on market
characteristics|other low-wage workers who now face greater job rationing, employers with monop-
sony power in the labor market, or consumers who now pay higher prices.23
Assuming low-wage workers are not concerned with adverse employment eects|a hypothesis
we directly test in the empirical work|they should generally exhibit the greatest support for
an increase relative to other workers. First, they themselves might see a raise, depending on the
dierence between their current wage and the proposed new minimum and the strength of spillover
eects to workers just above the proposed new minimum. Second, even for those who would not
be directly aected, the policy could act as wage insurance and should increase their reservation
wage. Finally, if low-wage workers are relatively substitutable, then those making just above the
current minimum should welcome an increase as employers would then have less opportunity to
replace them with lower-wage workers.
Last-place aversion, in contrast, predicts that individuals making just above the current mini-
mum would have limited enthusiasm for seeing it increased. The minimum wage essentially denes
the \last-place" wage a worker in most labor markets can legally be paid. A worker making just
above the current minimum might see a wage increase from the policy, but could now herself be
\tied" with many other workers for last place.
21See Gilens (1996) on the association white survey respondents make between welfare and African-Americans.
22In fact, Lee (1999) estimates that the majority of the growth in the wage gap between the tenth and ftieth
percentiles during the 1980s was due to the erosion of the federal minimum wage during the decade.
23There is a large literature on the eect of the minimum wage on employment levels, which we do not review
here. The monopsony argument was rst made by Stigler (1946), and Aaronson (2001) provides evidence of price
pass-through in the restaurant industry.
265.2 Evidence from online survey data
5.2.1 Data collection and summary statistics
Questions regarding the minimum wage have often appeared in opinion surveys, but to the best of
our knowledge none have also asked respondents to report their own wages (as opposed to income).
We thus designed our own survey, which was administered in the fall of 2010.24 Subjects were
randomly selected from a nationwide pool and invited to complete the online survey in exchange
for ve dollars. Enrollment in the study was limited to employed individuals between the ages of
23 and 64, so as to target prime-age workers. We also over-sampled low-wage and hourly workers.
The survey stated the current federal minimum wage ($7.25) and then asked respondents
whether it should be increased, decreased or left unchanged. The survey asked those who iden-
tied themselves as hourly-wage workers: \What is your current hourly wage? If you have more
than one job, please enter the wage for your main job." For those who did not specically identify
themselves as hourly workers, the survey asked: \If you are currently paid by the hour for the main
job you hold, what is your hourly wage? (Even if you are not actually paid by the hour, please
calculate your estimated hourly wage. You can do this by dividing your paycheck by how many
hours you typically work in a pay period.)"
We make the following sampling restrictions in generating our regression sample. First, we
drop the 74 people who completed the survey in less than two minutes (even though we wrote
the survey, it took us an average of three minutes to complete). We also drop from this sample
twelve individuals who report being unemployed but somehow slipped through the survey's lter.
We also drop 63 observations with missing or unusable wage data (e.g., \I work on commission,"
\Depends"). These exclusions leave a regression sample of 489 observations.
The rst column of Appendix Table 5 displays summary statistics from the online survey data.
Given the explicit oversampling of certain groups and the fact that online surveys by their nature
are not likely to appeal to the entire population equally, we do not expect the data to resemble
a random sample of the U.S. population. Indeed, compared to the sample from the Pew Research
Center that we use later in this section, there is over-representation of women and college graduates,
and under-representation of minorities and married people. The median wage in our sample is $13.60
24The survey was administered by C&T Marketing Group, http://www.ctmarketinggroup.com.
27and just over three-quarters of respondents support a minimum wage increase.
5.2.2 Graphical results
Figure 5 shows how support for increasing the minimum wage varies across wage groups in our
survey. The rst category includes those with wages at or below the current minimum, and this
group tends to be highly favorable toward minimum-wage increases.25 The most striking feature of
Figure 5, however, is the relative lack of support for minimum wage increases among those making
just above the current minimum. They are, in fact, the group least likely to support it, and the
dierence between them and other groups in the gure is often statistically signicant.
5.2.3 Regression results
Table 5 subjects the results in Figure 5 to regression analysis. Without any controls, the eect of
being \just above" the current minimum wage (i.e., making more than $7.25 but no more than
$8.25 an hour) is negative but not signicant. Note that this specication is somewhat demanding
because we do not include any other controls for wage or limit the sample to those with relatively
low wages. As such, those making just above the minimum wage are largely being compared to
those making substantially more than they do. When we limit the sample to those in the bottom
half of the wage distribution or control linearly for wage, the eect of being \just above" the current
minimum is statistically signicant.
For the sake of being conservative and parsimonious, we choose the more demanding specica-
tion in col. (1), and in col. (2) adding race, gender and age controls generates a negative coecient
on the \just above" indicator that is statistically signicant at the ten-percent level. Adding controls
for Census division and the state-level minimum wage in col. (3) has no eect on the coecient of
interest. Controlling in col. (4) for education, marital status and whether a participant is U.S.-born
slightly increases the magnitude of the eect. Controlling for party aliation, union status and
approval rating of President Obama also increases the eect slightly. With a small sample like ours,
the coecient estimate might be attributable to randomly having sampled, say, a very conservative
group who happen to make within a dollar of the current minimum. In fact, however, workers
25In one version of the survey, we asked questions specically designed to illicit information regarding people who
report making less than the minimum wage. About a third worked for tips. More than half reported that they thought
their own wage would rise if the minimum wage increased.
28making between $7.25 and $8.25 give Obama the highest approval rating of any of the wage groups
depicted in Figure 5.
An important concern regarding the results reported so far is that they may be driven by worries
regarding the eect of the minimum wage on the demand for low-wage labor and not last-place
aversion. For this reason, we also asked participants the following question: \Do you worry that if
the minimum wage is set too high, it might make employers reduce hiring and possibly cause you
to lose your job?" In col. (5), we show that individuals making just above the current minimum
are no more concerned than are other survey respondents. In fact, of the four lowest-wage groups
in Figure 5, those making between $7.25 and $8.25 report the lowest concern about employment
eects, and yet they exhibit the greatest opposition to a minimum wage increase.
5.3 Pew Research Center data
Workers in our survey making just above the minimum wage exhibit limited support relative to
other workers for seeing it raised, a result that might be seen as surprising but is consistent with
last-place aversion. We now seek conrming evidence in a more nationally representative sample.
As noted earlier, results from existing national surveys are at best just suggestive, as only income
and not wage data are available. Our approach in this section is to present the data with as little
analysis as possible and merely try to gauge whether the income patterns appear roughly consistent
with the wage patterns in our online survey.
5.3.1 The data
We selected every Pew Research Center survey over the past ten years that both asked respondents
if they approved or disapproved of a minimum wage increase and asked for their income and
employment status.26 Three surveys (from June 2001, December 2004, and March 2006) met these
criteria. During this period, the federal minimum wage was $5.15 per hour, and respondents were
asked about increasing it to $6.45, except that the March 2006 survey randomly assigned half the
sample to consider an increase to $6.45 and the other half to $7.15.
26We excluded other Pew surveys that instead asked whether increasing the minimum wage should be a \top
priority, important but lower priority, not too important or should not be done," because the wording was not similar
to our web survey. The other publicly-accessible national polls on the minimum wage are conducted by the New York
Times and CBS. We chose Pew over NYT/CBS because Pew oers greater disaggregation of income and thus more
detail on the income levels of poorer households.
29To match the online survey, we sample employed individuals between the ages of 23 and 64.
Summary statistics appear in the last two columns of Appendix Table 5.
5.3.2 Results
Figure 6 shows how support for increasing the minimum wage from $5.15 to $6.45 varies across
the income groups in the Pew survey. The raw data show a small drop in support going from the
lowest-income group to the second-lowest-income group, and a general downward trend in support
as income increases. When we control for basic demographics and background characteristics such as
education, marital status and political aliation, the relative opposition among the second-lowest-
income group increases. Conditional on these controls, individuals with family income between
$10,000 and $20,000 are the least supportive among all groups with annual family income below
$100,000.
Figure 7 is analogous to Figure 6 but includes only the smaller sample of participants (half of
the March 2006 survey) who were asked to consider a minimum wage increase from $5.15 to $7.15.
Individuals with family income between $20,000 and $30,000 are, both in the raw data and after
controlling for background characteristics, the least supportive of an increase among all respondents
with family income below $100,000. Interestingly, leaving aside the very highest income group, as
the hypothetical new minimum wage increases, the income level of the group most opposed to it
also increases, consistent with the last-place eect reaching further up in the income distribution.
How might the family income levels in the Pew survey relate to wages? On the one hand,
someone working fty weeks a year and forty hours a week would make $14,300 at a wage of $7.15
and $12,900 at a wage of $6.45. On the other hand, in the 2004 March Current Population Survey
the median family income of a worker between the ages of 23 and 64 who makes between $5.25 and
$7.15 an hour is between $25,000 and $30,000. As such, those who might be most aected by last-
place aversion concerns arising from minimum-wage increases would likely have income between
$10,000 and $30,000, consistent with Figures 6 and 7. However, it must be emphasized that the
correspondence between family income and wage levels is very rough, and thus that these results,
while generally consistent with the online data, are at most suggestive.
305.4 Discussion
In both our online survey and the Pew data, we nd that low-wage and low-income workers are
often the least likely to support increases in the minimum wage. The relatively tepid support
among low-income workers for such a transfer is consistent with last-place aversion, as those who
are marginally better o seek to retain their ability to distinguish themselves from those in \last
place." One might have expected that in moving from the laboratory|where reference groups are
xed and highly salient|to the eld|where individuals can be members of many peer groups|
would have diminished the LPA eect. However, these minimum wage results suggest that the
income or wage distribution is salient to individuals in the bottom of the distribution, resulting in
behavior consistent with the behavior observed in the laboratory experiments.
A further prediction of LPA not directly tested here is that not only are those at the bottom
of the distribution opposed to transfers to those just below them, but, relative to low-income
individuals, middle- and upper-income individuals are less opposed to a transfer to a marginally
worse-o group than themselves. A potential test of this prediction would be to ask individuals
their income and then describe a tax credit that phased out just below their income level. LPA
would predict that support for such a scheme would be weakest among low-income workers. In this
paper we wished to focus on an actual policy that would be familiar to respondents, but examining
how individuals respond to hypothetical transfer policies that benet dierent parts of the income
distribution is a potentially interesting question for future research.
As noted earlier, we chose to focus on the minimum wage in part to avoid the strong racial
connotations of redistributive programs such as welfare. But future work might wish to explore
implications of last-place aversion on racial attitudes. For example, African Americans have always
occupied a lower position in the national income distribution than whites, and thus might well serve
as the \last-place" reference group for whites. Of course, individual African Americans have higher
incomes than individual whites, but even today median household income for non-Hispanic whites is
over sixty percent higher than that of African Americans ($55,530 versus $34,218).27 LPA predicts
that this reference group should have little meaning to whites whose incomes place them a safe
distance from the bottom of the income distribution. However, for, say, the thirty percent of whites
27See Income, Poverty and Health Insurance Coverage in the United States, which is based on the 2008 Current
Population Survey, at http://www.census.gov/prod/2009pubs/p60-236.pdf.
31with household income below that of the median African-American household, any improvement
in the social or economic position of African Americans may cause signicant disutility and thus
lead them to oppose redistributive policies that might benet African Americans.
6 Conclusion
We began by presenting a simple model in which individual utility depends on a standard concave
function of income as well as an indicator variable for whether one is in last place among a nite
reference group. We then set up an experiment in which the model predicts that the two lowest-
placed members of a six-player game would have a higher propensity to choose a lottery over a
risk-free payment of equivalent expected value. The data strongly support this prediction, and the
elevated likelihood of gambling among the individuals with the lowest income is consistent with
the last-place person bearing the risk of the lottery for a chance to improve his rank and the
second-to-last-place person doing the same to defend against falling in rank.
In the money-transfer experiments we conducted, the tendency to give to the last-place player
is lowest for the second-to-last place player, again consistent with last-place aversion. Perhaps most
striking is that in order to maintain their rank, players close to last place will often give money to
players ranked above them rather than players ranked below.
We then apply the insights from the redistribution experiments to predict respondents' prefer-
ences regarding a particular redistributive policy|the minimum wage. Last-place aversion would
predict that those making just above the current minimum wage would face a trade-o: on the
one hand, they may receive a raise if the new minimum wage is above their current wage; on the
other hand, they would then join the \last-place" group. In data we collect ourselves, we nd that
support for a minimum wage increase is lowest among those making just above the current min-
imum. Using data from the Pew Research Center, we also nd that support for a minimum wage
increase is relatively low among groups whose income would suggest they themselves make close to
the minimum wage.
Future research might explore the implications of LPA in a seemingly unrelated domain: con-
sumer behavior. Past work has noted consumers' tendency to purchase the second cheapest wine
on a menu (McFadden, 1999). While consumers might be making rational inferences about product
32attributes (see, e.g., Kamenica, 2008), they might also be exhibiting a standard response to price
but simultaneously avoiding association with the \last-place" product. In a choice set of three or
four, these tendencies would lead consumers to pick a \middle" option|the \compromise eect"
in behavioral decision theory (Simonson, 1989).
LPA might also contribute to our understanding of the higher incidence of crime and delinquency
exhibited by members of lower socio-economic groups. Violent crime, especially among males, is
often related to status and \saving face," and LPA would indeed predict status anxiety to be
most acute near the bottom of a given distribution.28 For example, LPA might help explain why
criminal activity increased among the boys who moved to better neighborhoods in the Moving-to-
Opportunity study (Kling et al., 2005), as they now attend better schools where they are more
likely to be at the bottom of the classroom distribution.
Finally, modifying certain aspects of our experimental design would shed further light on last-
place aversion. While we took steps to design the experiments in a manner that would not bias us
toward nding evidence for last-place aversion, future research could relax some of these conditions
in order to examine which factors intensify or diminish LPA. We suspect that making payos public
or making rank a function of task performance would increase the magnitude of LPA. Outcomes
besides risk aversion and redistribution could also be studied; for example, will those in last place
work especially hard at a given task to try to move up in rank, or will they instead tend to give
up?29 In our experiments, the peer groups were randomly assigned and xed throughout the game,
but future work may focus on the role of LPA in endogenous group formation. For example, LPA
would predict that those with the lowest rank in a current game would be the most likely to choose
to join a dierent game with lower average payos but the promise of an improved rank.
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36Figure 1: Share choosing the lottery over the certain payment
Notes: Based on twelve six-player games of nine rounds each, for a total of 648 observations. Each round every player
was given the same choice between a two-outcome lottery and a risk-free payments of equivalent expected value. See
Section 3 for details. All p-values are based on OLS regressions with rank xed eects (omitted category rank = 5 or
rank = 6) and no other controls, with standard errors adjusted for clustering by individual. The rst p-value is from
estimating this equation on all rounds of data, and the second p-value from all rounds of data except the rst two.
Figure 2: Share choosing to forgo the additional $1
Notes: Based on four six-player games of eight rounds each, giving a total of 192 observations. Each player except the
last-place player were given the choice between giving an extra $2 to the last-place player or keeping an extra $1 for
themselves. The last-place player decided between keeping the additional $1 or giving $2 to the second-to-last place
person. See Section 4.1 for details. All p-values are based on OLS regressions with rank xed eects (omitted category
rank = 5) and no other controls, with standard errors adjusted for clustering by individual. The rst p-value is from
estimating this equation on all rounds of data, and the second p-value from all rounds of data except the rst two.
37Figure 3: Share choosing to give $2 to the lower-ranked player in their choice set
Notes: Based on seven six-player games of eight rounds each, giving a total of 336 observations. Each player except
the rst- and last-place player were given the choice between giving an extra $2 to the person directly above or
below them in the distribution. The rst-place player decided between the second- and third-place player, while the
last-place player decided between the fourth- and fth-place player. See Section 4.2 for details. All p-values are based
on OLS regressions with rank xed eects (omitted category rank = 5) and no other controls, with standard errors
adjusted for clustering by individual. The rst p-value is from estimating this equation on all rounds of data, and the
second p-value from all rounds of data except the rst two.
Figure 4: Share choosing to give $2 to the lower-ranked player in their choice set (eight-player game)
Notes: Based on nine eight-player games of nine rounds each, giving a total of 648 observations. Each player except
the rst- and last-place player were given the choice between giving an extra $2 to the person directly above or
below them in the distribution. The rst-place player decided between the second- and third-place player, while the
last-place player decided between the sixth- and seventh-place player. See Section 4.2 for details. All p-values are
based on OLS regressions with rank xed eects (omitted category rank = 7) and no other controls, with standard
errors adjusted for clustering by individual. The rst p-value is from estimating this equation on all rounds of data,
and the second p-value from all rounds of data except the rst two.
38Figure 5: Support for increasing the minimum wage from $7.25, by wage rate
Notes: Based on authors' online survey of employed individuals ages 23 to 64. See Section 5.2 for details. The rst
series displays the share of each wage group that supports increasing the minimum wage. The second series plots
the coecients (with p-values labeled) on the wage-category xed eects (omitted category $7:25 > wage  $8:25)
from an OLS regression that also controls for gender, race, ethnicity, educational level, party aliation, marital and
parental status, approval rating of President Obama, and union status.
Figure 6: Support for increasing the minimum wage from $5.15 to $6.45, by family income
Notes: Based on employed individuals ages 23 to 64 in June 2001, December 2004 and March 2006 Pew surveys. See
Section 5.3 for further detail. The rst series displays the share of each income group that supports increasing the
minimum wage. The second series plots the coecients on the income-group xed eects from an OLS regression
that also controls for gender, race, ethnicity, educational level, party aliation, marital and parental status, approval
rating of President Bush, and union status.
39Figure 7: Support for increasing the minimum wage from $5.15 to $7.15, by family income
Notes: Based on employed individuals ages 23 to 64 in the March 2006 Pew survey. Otherwise all analysis follows
that in Figure 6.
40Table 1: The eect of rank on propensity to choose the lottery over the certain payment
Dependent variable: Chose the lottery over the certain payment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Last or fth 0.390 0.357 1.046 0.464 0.450 0.376 0.441 0.297
place [0.126] [0.147] [0.377] [0.134] [0.137] [0.178] [0.142] [0.228]
Current balance 0.0258 0.0266 0.0276 0.0359 0.0296
[0.0127] [0.0126] [0.0127] [0.0219] [0.0126]
Winning lottery -0.0909 -0.0910 -0.0907 36.37 -0.0901
payment [0.0635] [0.0635] [0.0630] [31.44] [0.0633]
Certain payment 0.133 0.131 0.129 -48.51 0.123
[0.154] [0.154] [0.152] [41.93] [0.154]










Rounds All Ex. early First All All All All All
Observations 648 504 72 648 648 648 648 648
Notes: Based on twelve six-player games of nine rounds each. All regressions are estimated via probit and include
round xed eects and cluster standard errors by individual player. The dependent variable for all regressions is an
indicator variable coded as one if the subject chose the gamble over the risk-free payment. See Section 3 for further
details on the experiment. In specications that \exclude early" rounds, the rst two rounds are not included. \Could
catch next player" is an indicator variable for xi + winning payment > xi+1, where xi is player i's current balance
and xi+1 is that of the player directly above him. Following Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Disadvantageous inequality
is dened as
P
j6=i maxfxj   xi;0g and Advantageous inequality as
P
j6=i maxfxi   xj;0g. The  for each of these
variables is dened as the expected value when player i plays the lottery minus the value when he takes the certain
option.
p < 0:10;
 p < 0:05;
 p < 0:01.
41Table 2: The eect of rank on propensity to forgo the additional $1
Dependent variable: Chose to forgo the additional dollar
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Second-to-last place -0.786 -1.006 -0.482 -0.847 -0.388 -0.794 -0.501 -0.854
[0.463] [0.515] [0.422] [0.457] [0.518] [0.482] [0.472] [0.456]
Below median -0.396 -0.209
[0.293] [0.306]




Rounds All Ex. early All Ex. early All Ex. early All Ex. early
Observations 192 144 192 144 192 144 192 144
Notes: Based on four six-player games of eight rounds each. All regressions are estimated via probit, include round
xed eects and a separate control for being in last place (as this player's choice set is not directly parallel to the
others), and cluster standard errors at the individual level. The dependent variable is an indicator variable for whether
the individual chose to forgo the additional $1 so that another player (the last-place player, for ranks one through ve;
the second-to-last-place player, for the last-place player) could instead receive $2. See Section 4.1 for further details on
the experiment. Disadvantageous inequality is dened as
P
j6=i maxfxj   xi;0g, and Disadvantageous inequalityi
is dened as this sum when the player i forgos the additional dollar minus this sum when he keeps it. This variable
is collinear with Advantageous inequality and thus we cannot estimate both.
p < 0:10;
 p < 0:05;
 p < 0:01.
Table 3: Summarizing choice sets for players in the second redistribution game
Rank Initial balance Choice set: Give $2 to...
First $6 Second- or third-place player
Second $5 First- or third-place player
Third $4 Second- or fourth-place player
Fourth $3 Third- or fth-place player
Fifth $2 Fourth- or sixth-place player
Sixth $1 Fourth- or fth-place player
42Table 4: The eect of rank on propensity to give $2 to the lower-ranked player in choice set
Dependent variable: Gave money to the lower-ranked player
Six-player games Eight-player games Both
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Second from last -0.395* -0.0985 -0.268*
[0.231] [0.259] [0.160]
Second or third -0.259** -0.302** -0.315* -0.420** -0.320** -0.359** -0.464 -0.522* -0.382** -0.379**
from last [0.116] [0.130] [0.186] [0.188] [0.133] [0.145] [0.283] [0.287] [0.112] [0.112]
Below median -0.465** 0.0733 0.155
[0.234] [0.203] [0.220]




Rounds All All All All Ex. early All Ex. early All Ex. early All Ex. early All Ex. early
Observations 336 336 648 648 504 648 504 648 504 648 504 984 756
Notes: The rst three columns are based on seven six-player games of eight rounds each, giving a total of 336 observations, and the next three columns are based
on nine eight-player games of nine rounds each, giving a total of 648 observations. All regressions are estimated via probit, include round xed eects, and cluster
standard errors at the individual level. The dependent variable is an indicator variable for whether the individual chose to give $2 to the lower ranked of the two
players in his choice set. See Section 4.2 for further details on the experiment. Gini is dened as the Gini coecient if the player gives the additional $2 to the
higher-ranked player minus the Gini coecient if he gives the $2 to the lower-ranked player.
p < 0:10;
 p < 0:05;
 p < 0:01.
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3Table 5: Support for minimum wage increases by hourly wages
Support min wage increase (Yes/No) Job worries (1-7)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Just above current -0.243 -0.437 -0.436 -0.473 -0.499 -0.0230
min wage [0.234] [0.248] [0.253] [0.259] [0.269] [0.311]
Male -0.260 -0.258 -0.278 -0.218 -0.108
[0.139] [0.143] [0.147] [0.156] [0.176]
Black 1.064 1.170 1.116 0.588 -0.0309
[0.450] [0.475] [0.494] [0.527] [0.362]
Hispanic -0.437 -0.415 -0.399 -0.402 0.282
[0.437] [0.449] [0.478] [0.484] [0.591]
Age -0.00594 -0.00480 -0.000460 0.00556 -0.00351
[0.00623] [0.00642] [0.00731] [0.00791] [0.00816]
Specication Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit OLS
Demographic controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Background controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
Political controls No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 489 488 483 481 481 486
Notes: All data are from the minimum wage Internet survey. The rst ve regressions have as the dependent variable
an indicator variable coded as one if the respondent says he approves of a proposed minimum wage increase. The last
takes as its dependent variable the answer to the question: \Do you worry that if the minimum wage is set too high, it
might make employers reduce hiring and possibly cause you to lose your job?" where one indicates \not at all worried"
and seven indicates \very worried." \Demographic controls" include age, race, and ethnicity. \Geographic controls"
include xed eects for the eight Census divisions and the level of the state minimum wage. \Background controls"
include marital status; an indicator for being born in the US; and indicator variables for no high school, some high
school, high school degree, some college, two-year college degree, four-year college degree, master's degree, doctoral
degree, professional degrees. \Political controls" include: xed eects for major party alation; a one-to-seven approval
rating of President Obama; and union status. See Section 5.2 for further detail.
p < 0:10;
 p < 0:05;
 p < 0:01.
44Appendix Table 1: Summary statistics, experimental data
Section 3 Section 4.1 Section 4.2
Six-player games Eight-player games
Answered demographic 0.639 1 0.690 0.972
questions (0.484) (0) (0.468) (0.165)
Male 0.391 0.417 0.552 0.557
(0.493) (0.504) (0.506) (0.500)
Age 25.74 23.50 24.83 24.61
(2.955) (3.833) (4.184) (4.154)
Black 0.0652 0.125 0.103 0.0571
(0.250) (0.338) (0.310) (0.234)
Hispanic 0.239 0.0833 0.0690 0.114
(0.431) (0.282) (0.258) (0.320)
Full-time student 0.761 0.958 0.690 0.800
(0.431) (0.204) (0.471) (0.403)
Very conserv. (1) to 5.261 5.292 5.414 5.343
very liberal (7) (1.219) (1.429) (1.701) (1.295)
Not at all (1) to very 2.326 2.875 2.586 2.371
religious (5) (1.156) (1.262) (1.323) (1.265)
Observations 72 24 42 72
Notes: All observations are drawn from the pool of individuals who registered with the Harvard Business School
Computer Lab for Experimental Research (CLER). In order to be eligible, individuals must not be on the Harvard
University payroll, must be 18 or older, uent in English and comfortable using a computer. For tax purposes, they
must have a valid Social Security number or letter of sponsorship and visa connected to their country of tax residency.
All subjects were paid $15 per hour. Additionally, in the lottery experiment, they were told a randomly chosen player
would receive a cash payment equal to $20 plus his current balance in the game at that point. The $20 was given so
that no player would actually leave the experiment with less money than their hourly compensation.
45Appendix Table 2: Additional specications from the lottery experiment in Table 1
Dependent variable: Chose the lottery over the certain payment
Table 1, col. (1) Table 1, col. (4) Table 1, col. (6) Table 1, cols. (6), (7), (8)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Last or fth place 0.448 0.540 0.666 0.520 0.612 0.356 0.384 1.379 2.545 1.477
[0.142] [0.151] [0.261] [0.153] [0.161] [0.232] [0.241] [0.601] [0.966] [0.603]
Male -0.0291 -0.00745 0.0195
[0.142] [0.139] [0.136]
Black -0.472 -0.485 -0.598
[0.474] [0.505] [0.479]
Hispanic -0.0319 -0.0574 -0.0559
[0.161] [0.159] [0.156]
Age -0.0404 -0.0429 -0.0556
[0.0368] [0.0341] [0.0364]
Very conserv. (1) to -0.124 -0.114 -0.103
very liberal (7) [0.0543] [0.0555] [0.0528]
Not at all (1) to very -0.0205 -0.0202 -0.0117
religious (5) [0.0592] [0.0561] [0.0554]
Estim. method Probit Probit C. logit Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit
Player xed eects No No Yes No No No No No No No
Payment controls No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No
Below-median control No No No No No Yes Yes Yes No No
Ineq-aversion controls No No No No No No No No Yes No
Linear rank control No No No No No No No No No Yes
Round All All All All All All All First First First
Observations 414 414 594 414 414 414 414 72 72 72
Notes: The dependent variable for all regressions is an indicator variable coded as one if the subject chose the gamble over the risk-free payment (see Section 3 for
further details on the experiment). Each specication tests the robustness of a key result from the main text, and the column headings refer to the specication
being tested. Fixed eects for educational attainment are included in cols. (2), (5) and (7). \Payment controls" include the individual's current earnings, the
winning amount of the lottery and amount of the certain payment. In cols. (1), (4) and (6), observations with any missing value for the variables included in,
respectively, cols. (2), (5) and (7) are dropped so that the sample is constant for each pair of specications. Cols. (8) through (10) use only observations from the
rst round to test whether the eect of being in fth or sixth place can be separated from, respectively, the eect of being below the median, inequality-aversion
controls, and a linear eect of rank.
p < 0:10;
 p < 0:05;
 p < 0:01.
4
6Appendix Table 3: Additional specications from the rst redistribution experiment in Table 2
Dependent variable: Chose to forgo the additional dollar
Table 2, col. (1) Table 2, col. (3) Table 2, col. (5)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Second-to-last place -0.786 -0.843 -2.932 -0.482 -0.583 -0.388 -0.470
[0.463] [0.465] [1.053] [0.422] [0.430] [0.518] [0.533]
Below median -0.396 -0.334
[0.293] [0.267]
 Disadv. -0.113 -0.106
inequality [0.109] [0.110]
Male -0.368 -0.346 -0.347
[0.511] [0.521] [0.518]
Black -0.538 -0.500 -0.529
[0.704] [0.710] [0.710]
Hispanic -0.124 -0.127 -0.116
[0.719] [0.719] [0.722]
Age 0.0376 0.0350 0.0336
[0.0662] [0.0656] [0.0664]
Very conserv. (1) to -0.0350 -0.0358 -0.0397
very liberal (7) [0.120] [0.122] [0.122]
Not at all (1) to 0.00802 0.0101 0.00263
very religious (5) [0.180] [0.176] [0.182]
Estim. method Probit Probit C. logit Probit Probit Probit Probit
Player xed eects No No Yes No No No No
Observations 192 192 120 192 192 192 192
Notes: The dependent variable for all regressions is an indicator variable coded as one if the subject chose to forgo
the additional dollar (see Section 4.1 for a description of the experiment). Each specication tests the robustness of
a key result from the main text, and the column headings refer to the specication being tested. Fixed eects for
educational attainment are included in cols. (2), (5) and (7). In cols. (1), (4) and (6), observations with any missing
value for the variables listed in, respectively, cols. (2), (5) and (7) are dropped so that the sample is constant for each
pair of specications.
p < 0:10;
 p < 0:05;
 p < 0:01.
47Appendix Table 4: Additional specications from the second redistribution experiment in Table 4
Dependent variable: Gave money to the lower-ranked player in choice set
Table 4, col. (4) Table 4, col. (6) Table 4, col. (12) Interactions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Second or third from -0.246 -0.253 -0.373 -0.385 -0.290 -0.300 -0.463 0.235 -1.714
last [0.120] [0.134] [0.197] [0.199] [0.116] [0.123] [0.276] [0.211] [0.643]
Religious (1-5) x Second -0.224
or third from last [0.0859]
Age x Second or third 0.0580
from last [0.0240]
Below median 0.166 0.172
[0.201] [0.209]
Male -0.00566 -0.00243 -0.143
[0.247] [0.247] [0.202]
Black 0.0124 0.0137 0.0693
[0.407] [0.406] [0.269]
Hispanic -0.0604 -0.0551 -0.254
[0.397] [0.393] [0.354]
Age -0.0348 -0.0346 -0.00373 -0.0208
[0.0295] [0.0294] [0.0256] [0.0270]
Very conserv. (1) to 0.238 0.238 0.0906
very liberal (7) [0.109] [0.109] [0.0755]
Not at all (1) to very 0.219 0.219 0.156 0.198
religious (5) [0.129] [0.129] [0.0823] [0.0816]
Estim. method Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit C. logit Probit Probit
Player xed eects No No No No No No Yes No No
Observations 630 630 630 630 862 862 489 862 862
Notes: The dependent variable for all regressions is an indicator variable coded as one if the subject chose to give to the lower-ranked member in his choice set
(see Section 4.2 for a description of the experiment). Each specication in cols. (1) though (7) tests the robustness of a key result from the main text, and the
column headings refer to the specication being tested. Fixed eects for educational attainment are included in cols. (2), (4) and (6). In cols. (1), (3) and (5),
observations with any missing value for the variables listed in, respectively, cols. (2), (4) and (6) are dropped so that the sample is constant for each pair of
specications. Cols. (8) and (9) add interaction terms to the Table 4 col. (12) specication.
p < 0:10;
 p < 0:05;
 p < 0:01.
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8Appendix Table 5: Summary statistics, minimum wage surveys
Online survey Pew Research Center surveys
All All Fam. inc.< $50,000
Male 0.301 0.520 0.476
(0.459) (0.500) (0.500)
Married 0.280 0.600 0.440
(0.450) (0.490) (0.497)
Age 44.32 41.39 39.94
(10.72) (10.62) (11.03)
Black 0.0593 0.111 0.157
(0.236) (0.315) (0.364)
Hispanic 0.0184 0.112 0.134
(0.135) (0.316) (0.341)
College graduate 0.382 0.337 0.195
(0.486) (0.473) (0.396)
Family income last year 59458.1 69446.4 30090.4
(43498.5) (50935.8) (11363.2)
Supports minimum wage 0.785 0.872 0.907
increase (0.411) (0.334) (0.291)
Observations 489 2544 1136
Notes: All data taken from Pew surveys from June 2001, December 2004, and March 2006. Only individuals who
report being employed are sampled.
49Appendix A Instructions for the lottery game
Scrambled is a game of chance, where you play against other players in your row. In this version
of the game, most of you are not playing for real money. However, at the end of the session, the
computer will automatically select one round from one player in the session. That player will be
given an extra $20.00 plus whatever they won or lost in the selected round. With that in mind, you
should play the whole game as if you are playing for real money.
To get started, please type your name or nickname in the eld provided and click the button
to continue. Then, wait for further instructions.
[Wait 15 seconds People should be standing up.]
At this point, everyone should see a big red stop sign on their screen. Please raise your hand if
you dont see a stop sign.
[Fix problems until everyone sees the stop sign.]
Before we continue, there are two things I need to mention:
(i) You will play a number of rounds in this game. In each round, before you can proceed to
the next round, everyone in your row must rst make a decision. If you feel you have been
waiting too long, please raise your hand and I will come around and see whats going on.
(ii) Please dont click the next, back or refresh buttons in your browser while playing this game.
If you do, it will break the game for all of the players in your row.
Does anyone have any questions at this point?
Please sit down and click the button to continue. You will now see instructions about how to
play the game. Once you have read the instructions, you will be able to click the button to get
started.
Please read the instructions and click the button marked Continue to begin the game
Typical screenshot from the lottery game
50Appendix B Solving for the Nash Equilbirum of the Lottery Experiment
Assumptions
As discussed in the text, we assume individuals play each round as a one-shot game. We also assume
that when the fth-place player takes the \certain" option, the last-place player can pass him if he
wins the lottery (a condition that holds in the majority of rounds in the data).
Claim 1. The dominent strategy of players in ranks one through four is to choose the \certain"
option, whereas for suciently large  the players in ranks ve and six will play a mixed strategy
between the \certain" option and the lottery.
Proof. The proof for ranks one through four is outlined in Section 3 and here we just focus on the
last- and fth-place players.
Since the game is nite by assumption and meets the other conditions of the Nash Existence
Theorem, there must be an NE between these two players. Here, we show that there is no pure-
strategy NE, so it must be the case that the two players play a mixed strategy between taking the
lottery option and taking the certain option.
Below we show that for suciently large  none of the four potential pure strategies are NEs.
Both pick \certain"




> f(y + certain)   (1
4f(y   lose) + 3
4f(y + win));
equation (3) from the text (y is his current balance). In other words, so long as  is suciently
large, the last-place player is willing to take on additional risk for the possibility of escaping last
place.
Last-place player picks \certain" and fth-place player picks lottery
If the last-place player plays certain, then the fth-place player can always maintain his rank by
also playing certain. He will always prefer this option because he is risk-averse and prefers not to
take a gamble of equal expected value to the certain option. Moreover, this option also brings a
risk of losing the lottery and falling into last-place himself, which has additional, negative utility
consequences for any positive value of .
Fifth-place player picks \certain" and last-place player picks lottery
This case was already examined in Section 3. If the last-place player plays the lottery, then the
fth-place player would rather play the lottery whenever
9
16(1   )
> f(y + certain)   (3
4f(y   lose) + 1
4f(y + win));
equation (4) from the text.
51Both pick lottery
The last-place player would rather pick the \certain" option, because if the fth-place player picks
the lottery, then playing the lottery never gives the last-place player any greater chance of moving
up than does playing the certain option regardless of whether the fth-place player wins or loses.
Thus, he would rather avoid the risk and play the safe option.
Consider the two possibilities when the fth-place player picks the lottery. If he wins, then even
if the last-place player also wins the lottery he cannot move up, so playing the lottery oers him
no greater chance of moving up than does the certain option (both oer a probability of zero).
If the fth-place player loses the lottery, then, as we show below, he will fall into last place with
probability one if the last-place player picks the \certain" option. Thus, playing the lottery gives
the sixth-place player no greater chance of moving up under this scenario either.
Using the notation from Section 3, let the current balances of the last-place, fth- and fourth-
place place player be, respectively, 6 < 5 < 4. Recall that certain = 5 6
2 and win = 4   6:
By construction, 3
4win   1
4lose = certain; or, lose = 3win   4certain:
Substituting the formulae for win and certain gives:












= 5   6:
So, if the fth-place player loses the lottery, we have that
5   lose < 5   (5   6) = 6:
Therefore, the last-place player will always move up by picking the certain option (or, in fact, by
doing nothing, though that is not an option).
Appendix C Instructions for redistribution games
The Moneybags Game is a game where you play with X other players in the lab. During the game,
you will play several rounds, and at the beginning of each round, the computer will randomly hold
a lottery, and give you and the other players in your group dierent amounts of money.
During each round, you will be presented with a choice about who should get more money. This
additional money is drawn from a separate pool and does not take away from the amount of money
you have. The choices you make are private, and will not be shown to anyone playing the game at
any time.
Once everyone in your group has made a choice, the computer will randomly select one players
choice, and award the additional money as that player decided. At that point, everyones score will
be updated, but you will not be shown the nal score from the round. Then, a new lottery will be
held and the next round will automatically begin.
In this version of the game, most of you are not playing for real money. However, at the end of
the session, the computer will automatically select one round from one group and every player in
that group will receive their nal score from that round. With that in mind, you should play the
whole game as if you are playing for real money.
To get started, please type your name or nickname in the eld provided and click the button
to continue. Then, wait for further instructions.
52[Wait 15 seconds People should be standing up.]
At this point, everyone should see a big red stop sign on their screen. Please raise your hand if
you dont see a stop sign.
[Fix problems until everyone sees the stop sign.]
Before we continue, there are two things I need to mention:
(i) As I mentioned before, you will play a number of rounds in this game. In each round, before
you can proceed to the next round, everyone in your group must rst make a decision. If you
feel you have been waiting too long, please raise your hand and I will come around and see
whats going on.
(ii) Please dont click the next, back or refresh buttons in your browser while playing this game.
If you do, it will break the game for all of the players in your group.
Does anyone have any questions at this point?
Please sit down and click the button to continue. Well now play a practice round together. This
round is for practice only. If you have any questions during the practice round, please raise your
hand. When the practice round ends, you will automatically begin with round 1. Click the continue
button to start the practice round.
Typical screenshot from the rst redistribution game
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